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The New Mexican Industrial
Development Plan
Mexico is just beginning to reap a tremendous oil harvest. It is now reach-
ing its ceiling production level of 2-1/4 million barrels of oil a day, which level
had earlier not been expected to be attained until 1983.' Mexico is exporting
approximately half its production and is obtaining OPEC prices for these
exports. At these rates, Mexico should receive well over $10 billion (U.S.) in
oil export revenues in 1980.2
These figures represent a significant turning point for Mexico as viewed
from outside and inside of Mexico. For Americans, it is truly shocking to
find, after all these years, that we may have grabbed the wrong half of Mex-
ico. For Mexicans, these new circumstances present a unique opportunity to
attack serious problems. The Mexican government appears determined to
properly manage this opportunity.
The keystone in the government's plan to manage the oil wealth for prog-
ress in Mexico is the National Industrial Development Plan which was
enacted last year. This plan formulates industrial policy for Mexico for the
short range, through 1982, and for the long range, through 1990. It arose out
of both the opportunity presented by the oil reserves and the emergency
presented by Mexico's deepening economic problems.3
Mexico's greatest economic problem is unemployment. Mexico's high
birth rate has given the nation a present population of approximately 70
million people. The demographic trend has been for the growing excess popu-
lation from the countryside to pour into the cities and live on a static volume
of domestic food production.' The overpopulation of the cities has caused
serious urban problems of crowding, pollution and unemployment. Mexico
City now has about 8.8 million residents and perhaps many more who have
not been counted.
The cities of Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey house the over-
whelming majority of Mexico's present industrial capacity. The industrial
base is characterized by a small number of large oligopolies and an enormous
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number of small companies of marginal productivity and profitability. His-
torically, imports have exceeded exports in Mexico, and this balance of pay-
ments problem played a key role in the weakening and eventual devaluation
of the peso in 1976.6 Even after the devaluation, inflation continued to be a
serious Mexican problem and, except for the recent surge in the United States'
inflation, has been running at about double the United States' rate.,
In analyzing these problems, Mexican economists place no small measure
of blame on the "import substitution" policy followed by the Mexican gov-
ernment since the 1940s. As was generally well known to potential foreign
investors, this policy used a system of import permits to encourage foreign
companies to construct plants in Mexico rather than importing from abroad
to serve the Mexican market. One could make arrangements with the Mexi-
can government for construction on the condition that competitors not be
allowed to import into Mexico. In some cases, this did reduce imports, but its
impact on the balance of payments was insufficient because it did not en-
courage exports. In fact, it often actually increased imports by permitting the
importation of machinery and subassemblies to the protected factories.'
Most importantly, the resulting industry was tailored principally to satisfy
Mexican consumer needs with no concern for the utilization of Mexican raw
materials or labor for the world market. As a consequence, industry concen-
trated in the cities where the consumer demand existed and avoided the areas
with easy access to raw material resources or export transportation.
The National Industrial Development Plan of 1979 intends to treat these
problems by de-emphasizing the import substitution policy and more thor-
oughly guiding the economy toward specific goals with a combination of tax
incentives and favorable energy rates. The plan also mentions low interest
loans, new sources of capital and a coordinated government procurement
policy as potential lures for investors.9 With these devices the Mexican gov-
ernment expects to greatly increase investment in and development of a less
concentrated economy which is more geographically dispersed, particularly
to areas along the borders and near ports.
The plan calls for significantly improved productivity, particularly with a
view toward the world marketplace. It is Mexico's policy to export no more
than half of its oil, leaving the remainder to meet its own energy needs and to
create a secondary petrochemical industry.'I Following these policies, Mex-
ico plans an annual gross national product increase of about 10 percent per
year from 1982 through 1990. '
To be specific, the plan sets investment priorities among industrial activi-
ties. Particularly high priorities are given to investments in the capital goods
'Id. at 17.
73 INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD (Mexico) 3 (May, 1980).
'1 DEVELOPMENT PLAN, ch. I at 9.
'Id. at 15 and id., ch. IV at 58.
"WORLD Bus. WEEKLY, Feb. 25, 1980, at 32.
"I DEVELOPMENT PLAN, ch. I, at 18.
654 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
manufacturing and food processing industries.' 2 For instance, the plan con-
templates a short range enhancement for investment in the manufacture of
electric machinery that is 148 percent of the investment level without the
Plan.' 3 Similarly, investment increases of 104 percent in the manufacture of
metal products and of 118 percent in the production and processing of meat
and milk products are expected to be implemented under the plan.' 4 To en-
courage industries to decentralize, the plan gives priority to investment in
certain geographic regions. ' 5 Zone One, which offers the highest incentives,
includes new industrial ports, a number of coastal and border areas and areas
served by natural gas pipelines, including the new 48-inch gaslines.' 6 Zone
Two, with somewhat lower incentives, includes areas selected by the individ-
ual states for industrial activities. '" Zone Three, comprised primarily of Mex-
ico City, is segregated in order to discourage, rather than to encourage
further industrial development.'I
By combining the priorities attached to the nature and location of a pro-
posed investment project, one can determine the level of incentive to be of-
fered for the development. The highest priority activities carried out in the
highest priority locations will obtain a 30 percent discount on natural gas,
fuel oil, electricity or other energy rates (which are already somewhat lower in
Mexico than on'the international market), and a 20-25 percent of fixed asset
value investment tax credit.' 9 The level of the tax credit will depend on
whether the taxpayer is a "small business," i.e., a company with fixed assets
of about $440,000 (U.S.) or less."0 Investments with less than top priority
receive lower energy discounts and tax incentives.
In general, Mexico's practice of using import permits to close its trade
border will be replaced by a tariff structure2 ' in which, presumably, some
protectionist flavor will remain.
Mexico will continue its in-bond program for assembly plants,22 under
which a foreigner may own 100 percent of a plant in Mexico; ship parts to the
plant from his home country free of Mexican duty; assemble the parts in
Mexico; employ Mexican labor and ship the finished product back to his
home country.23 Assuming the home country is the United States, American
21d., ch. 1II, at 38-40.
"Id., ch. 1, at 27.
I-Id.
"Id. ch. Ill, at 45-52.
61d. ch. i, at 13.
"Id.; id., ch. III at 45.
'Id. Ch. 1, at 13; id., ch. III, at 51.
"Id. ch. IV, at 54-57.
20A "small business" is one with total fixed assets, including those of affiliated companies,
that do not exceed 200 times the annual minimum wage in the Federal District. 3 INVESTING,
LICENSING & TRADING CONDITIONS ABROAD (Mexico) 25 (1979).
2I DEVELOPMENT PLAN, ch. IV, at 58.
:'Id. at 57.
"3 INVESTING, LICENSING & TRADE CONDITIONS ABROAD (Mexico) 4 (May 1980).
New Mexican Industrial Development Plan
duties apply only on the value added to the product at the in-bond plant in
Mexico.24
In-bond assembly plants also may sell a small portion of their finished
product in Mexico by paying Mexican duty only on that portion.25 They
benefit in some circumstances from stamp tax waivers in leases and from
import duty waivers on machinery and equipment.26 Because the in-bond
progam already is successfully stimulating considerable activity, such for-
eign-controlled plants will receive no additional benefits under the new incen-
tive program.2"
However, for Mexicanized companies outside the in-bond program which
employ people, produce capital goods, help solve the food shortage, increase
Mexican exports and/or locate in the newly designated industrial centers,
there is now a tax credit and energy saving incentive package. Further, the
plan alludes to low interest loans and other aids.
In concluding that such development activities should be encouraged, the
development plan embodies a sophisticated appraisal of Mexico's problems,
of their origins and of the types of investments that are needed to attack the
problems. In seeking to avoid excessive exporting of Mexico's crude oil, the
Development Plan has provided an intelligent guide to the appropriate
management of Mexico's oil wealth.
Implementation
Unfortunately, the plan does not provide for the actions necessary to im-
plement its terms. For whatever reasons, political or otherwise, the incentives
offered are likely to be seen by potential foreign investors as very meager fare
in view of the continuing difficulties of investing in Mexico.
First, neither of the incentives discussed here28 is intended to be available in
the long term. The energy cost saving is not expected to be offered after
1989,29 and in any event, a 30 percent discount is stingy in view of Mexico's
resources and its intention to raise its base domestic price to near-OPEC
levels. The tax saving occurs as a one-time investment tax credit, rather than
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addition, the benefit of a tax credit often is neutralized for United States
investors by the United States foreign tax credit system. Outright grants and
subsidies, features of programs in some other countries, are totally lacking in
Mexico. The foreign investor also remains entrapped in the requirements of
the Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and Regulation of For-
eign Investment3 ' and the Law on Transfer of Technology and Use and Ex-
ploitation of Patents and Trademarks.32 Both laws took effect in 1973. These
restrictions apply to foreign investors, regardless of their involvement with
the incentive program, and in fact, applicants for incentives may face more
stringent requirements.
The transfer of technology law requires that all transfer of technology
agreements be registered with and approved by the National Registry of
Technology Transfer. Such agreements include license agreements, manage-
ment agreements and training and technical services agreements which are so
often a key part of any investment by a United States company in the develop-
ing world. In its approval procedure and in international forums on the sub-
ject, such as the United National Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), Mexico has been an outspoken leader of the Third World. Mex-
ico is aggressive about rejecting and rewriting contract terms agreeable to
both parties and otherwise acceptable in international business, e.g., royalty
rates above 3-5 percent, grant-back clauses for new developments, export
limitations and terms for more than ten years.3 3 While this surely counteracts
some genuine abuses, it also effectively discourages needed technology trans-
fer and related investment.
The substance of the Law for the Regulation of Foreign Investment can be
summarized as follows: All foreign investments in Mexico must be registered
with and approved by the National Commission on Foreign Investment and,
except for special circumstances, foreigners cannot purchase more than 25
percent of the stock or 49 percent of the assets of an existing Mexican com-
pany. Also, foreigners may not hold more than 49 percent, or actual manage-
ment control, of any new Mexican ventures.3" Further, under this law, for-
eign participation is limited to 40 percent in the secondary petrochemical
industry and in the production of automobile parts, and is prohibited in a
number of activities, e.g. petroleum and hydrocarbon production, basic
petrochemical and certain mining activities, railroads, air and highway trans-
portation, radio and television, and a few others.
3
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To obtain permission to invest in permitted activities is not difficult so long
as the foreigner invests no more than the permitted percentage and does not
control management. The commission historically rejects only a small per-
centage of proposed investments within those guidelines.3"
Also, although it occurs seldom, significantly more than 49 percent partici-
pation may be allowed if a proposed project meets most or all of Mexico's
development needs, by offering such features as high employment, high ex-
ports, a favorable location and a significant technology transfer to Mexico.
Texas Instruments, for example, recently obtained approval for 100 percent
ownership of a $60 million investment in Mexican plants involving consider-
able high technology transfer and production of goods, 80 percent of which
will be destined for the export market.3 7 However, it is often the case that
majority ownership is permitted on the condition that the firm be "Mex-
icanized" to at least 51 percent Mexican ownership over a period of several
years."
On their face, the above investment restrictions do not appear to be par-
ticularly draconian. They are enforced with some flexibility and do lack some
severe features that exist in similar laws elsewhere in the developing world.
For instance, unlike Brazil, Mexico has no exchange controls, allows tech-
nology transfer to be considered part of an equity investment and allows
subsidiaries to pay royalties to their parents.39 To complete the picture,
though, one must note that while some progress is said to have been made,
Mexico remains notorious for bureaucratic inefficiency, and corruption is a
problem in certain sectors.
The overall picture, then, is of a regulatory scheme which in most in-
stances, freely allows investment subject only to a limited return on invested
technology and the minority ownership restriction. However, as practical
managers know, those small restrictions can be very meaningful.
In particular, the minority ownership rule essentially requires a great deal
of trust between the foreign investor and the local majority owners. A care-
fully drafted joint venture agreement can give a measure of protection, par-
ticularly in provisions for dispute settlements and liquidations. Still, there is
no substitute for trust based on a thorough knowledge of the particular local
participants and a carefully nurtured, harmonious relationship.
The key to the latter is the formulation of a business plan, the economic
success of which is substantial and assured, by a very comfortable projected
rate of return. While this may appear obvious, consider the United States
Department of Commerce figures which indicate that in 1977, an ordinary
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year, United States firms earned an overall 9.2 percent rate of return on
Mexican investments. Such a rate of return alone probably will not assure
harmony or justify a risky investment.
To avoid the minority ownership problem, the investor must appeal to the
Foreign Investment Commission and assert that he meets the same sort of
criteria as those for the incentives in the Development Plan. Unfortunately,
according to the terms of the Development Plan, if the investor succeeds in
gaining majority ownership, he is disqualified from the Development Plan's
incentive scheme. If that is, in fact, the way the incentives are enforced, in
practice they are likely to be seen as little incentive indeed.
To suffer minority ownership in exchange for the Plan's tax credits and
energy rate reductions would appear attractive only to the most energy-
intensive operations. Even then, they would be attractive only where suitable
arrangements between foreign minority and Mexican majority investors
could be made. This type of investment in Mexico would probably be at-
tracted to Mexico's oil economy even without the new Development Plan
incentives.
To attract a variety of balanced industrial development while rigidly en-
forcing the minority ownership rules, the incentive scheme would have to be
much more generous-sufficiently generous to create the expectations of
profit levels at which potential disputes with majority partners are less likely
or at least are a less important factor in the investment decision.
Although this is a somewhat pessimistic view of the prospects for the incen-
tive scheme of the Development Plan to meet the ambitious goals of the Plan,
a more optimistic and perhaps more important aspect of the Plan exists. The
Plan reflects a new attitude toward encouraging foreign investment which, in
Mexico's case, generally has meant investment from the United States.
The laws of 1973 reflect the economic nationalism that has governed Mexi-
can policy in varying intensities for many decades. Those laws, and other
anti-foreigner laws such as the 1976 Law of Inventions and Trademarks,"0
which require foreign trademarks to be linked with new Mexican marks, will
not disappear from the books. However, this new realization of the critical
need for Mexico to participate in the world market and in the United States
market through exports will determine how those laws are enforced.
It remains to be seen whether foreign investors will gamble on the per-
manence of this attitude. To adhere to the Development Plan, as Written, in
the face of inflationary pressures and the great temptation to make an easy
peso by the export of crude oil will be difficult enough. It may be too much to
hope that Mexico will go beyond the Development Plan and expand its incen-
tives to actually encourage investment.
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